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quired is usually sufficiently strong so as to indicate guilt independent
of the information. If past experience has proved the informer to be
reliable, the amount of corroboration necessary is less than that re-
quired if the informer is unreliable. How much less depends upon the
facts of each case.
ROBERT STEPntN PLESS
JURY INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF
RISK UNDER FELA
The question arises in actions under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act as to whether the trial judge should instruct the jury on
the issue of assumption of risk, despite the fact that assumption of
risk is not a defense under the Act.1
This question was presented in Koshorek v. Pennsylvania R.R.2
The plaintiff, who had worked for eighteen years for the Pennsylvania
Railroad in a car repair shop, had to stop work on account of a lung
condition, diagnosed as pulmonary emphysema and fibrosis. Koshorek
brought an action against the Railroad, contending that operations in
the repair shop created a silica hazard by raising dust and dirt in the
air, and that his lung condition was caused by exposure to this hazard.
There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether a silica hazard
actually existed, the plaintiff admitting that he was aware of the
dust in the shop. The trial judge instructed the jury as to the Rail-
road's affirmative duties and on the issue of comparative negligence. 3
The plaintiff also requested an instruction on assumption of risk un-
der the FELA to the effect that the plaintiff did not assume any risk
as a result of the Railroad's failure to supply a reasonably safe place
to work.4 The court refused the instruction on the ground that the
point was already covered adequately and properly by the instruction
on the Railroad's affirmative duties. The jury returned a verdict for the
defendant Railroad. The plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied
and he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit on the ground that the District Court erred in its refusal to
grant the requested instruction.
'For compilation of cases raising this question under the FELA see 45 U.S.C.A.
§ 54, notes 22o-23 (1954).
2318 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1963).
3id. at 366 n.7.
41d. at 366 n.8.
CASE COMMENTS
The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the judgment of
the District Court, remanding for a new trial. The court stated that
the "retention of the doctrine of comparative negligence and the ab-
rogation of the defense of assumption of risk necessitates that a careful
distinction between the two concepts be made in a case such as that
at bar arising under the Act," and further, "[H]ad an adequate dis-
tinction between conduct constituting contributory negligence and
that which would have constituted assumption of risk been pointed
out to the jurors in the charge, the jury might well have reached a
different verdict."
6
The Federal Employers' Liability Act7 adopts the doctrine of com-
parative negligence, s under which contributory negligence by the em-
ployee does not bar but only diminishes the amount of recovery. How-
ever, where a violation by the employer of a safety statute contributed
to the injury or death, the Act completely abolishes contributory
negligence as a defense.9 Under the 1939 Amendment,10 the Act also
rId at 367.
(1d. at 369-70.
MThe first Federal Employers' Liability Act, 34 Stat. 232, was passed in 19o6,
but was held unconstitutional because it included employees engaged in intrastate
commerce. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908). The second Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (19o8), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958), passed in
igoS, covers liability of railroads engaged in interstate commerce to their employees.
It was held constitutional. Second Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). Un-
like most Workmen's Compensation Acts, liability under the FELA is based upon
the employer's negligence.
6"Comparative negligence by the plaintiff is that negligence which joins with
the negligence of the defendant in proximately causing the injuries of the plaintiff
and goes in reduction of the amount of recovery in proportion that the negligence
of the plaintiff compares with that of defendant. Whatley v. Henry, go
Ga. 486, 16 S.E.2d 214, 220 (1941).
'45 U.S.C. § 53 (1958) provides: "In all actions hereafter brought against any
such common carrier by railroad under or by virture of any of the provisions of
this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where
such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall
be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to such employee: Provided, That no such employee who may be injured or killed
shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the
violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of em-
ployees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
"0 Under the Act as passed in igoS the defense of assumption of risk is available
to the employer, except where the employer's violation of a safety statute con-
tributed to the injury or death of the employee. Ch. 149, § 4, 35 Stat. 65. This
section, as amended by the Act of August 11, 1939, states: "In any action brought
against any common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this
chapter to recover damages for injuries to, or the death of, any of its employees,
such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in
1964]
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provides that the employee does not assume any risk of employment
where the negligence of the employer": was a contributing cause of
the injury or death.
12
In the absence of an instruction on assumption of risk there are
two possible errors that the jury may make. The possibility of such
errors provides a reason why the trial judge should instruct the jury
on assumption of risk even though it is not a defense under the Act.
The first possible error is that the jury will consider actions of the
plaintiff constituting assumption of risk as establishing that the em-
ployer was not negligent. Under the literal language of the 1939
amendment, the defense of assumption of risk is eliminated only when
there has been negligence by the employer.13 It would seem, therefore,
that it would not make any difference whether the jury based its de-
cision for the defendant on assumption of risk by the plaintiff or non-
negligence of the defendant. However, the United States Supreme
Court in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.14 held that "every vestige
of the doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated from the law by
the 1939 Amendment, and that Congress, by abolishing the defense
of assumption of risk in that statute, did not mean to leave open the
identical defense for the master by changing its name to 'non-negli-
gence.' ,15 Thus, the Supreme Court has abolished assumption of
risk, in both its meanings,' 6 as a defense. It is pointed out by Harper
any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for
the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee." Ch.
865, § 4, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1958)-
nThe amendment, by including "officers, agents, and employees" of the rail-
road, has abolished the common law "fellow servant doctrine." Under the Act, the
negligence of a fellow employee is treated as negligence of the employer, and can-
not defeat recovery. See Joice v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 354 Mo. 439, 189 S.W.2d
568, 572-73 (1945).
'-For the United States Supreme Court interpretation of the amendment see
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (943).
'1"[E]mployee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment
in any case where such injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negli-
gence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier . (Emphasis
added.) 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1954).
'318 U.s. 54 (1943).
'LId. at 58.
'6"[A]ssumption of risk had come to have a dual aspect in master and servant
cases, namely, (i) assumption of the ordinary risks of employment which the master
was not bound to protect the servant against, but the servant had to protect him-
self against, and (2) assumption of risks created by the negligence of the master
(but known to and appreciated by the servant)." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his
concurring opinion in the Tiller case, supra note 14 at 68, contended the amend-
ment abolished only the second aspect. However, a majority of the court did not
agree. 2 Harper & James, Torts § 21.4 n.9 at 1177, 1178 (1956).
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and James 17 that this decision did not eliminate negligence as a basis
of liability under the Act, but it removed the burden of self-protec-
tion from the employee and requires the employer to protect the
employee against foreseeable sources of injury. It follows that a situa-
tion may arise where the jury may return an erroneous judgment by
considering the plaintiff's assumption of the risk of the working con-
ditions under the guise of non-negligence of the employer. Such a
situation arose in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burkett1 where the
plaintiff sustained injuries from falling backwards over a pile of
debris while carrying a rail. The plaintiff contended that, although he
knew the debris was there, the defendant was liable because he did not
use reasonable care to furnish the plaintiff a safe place to work. The
defendant contended that it was not negligent, that it was the plain-
tiff's duty to keep the yard free of debris, and that the employee's
negligence in walking backwards caused the accident. The trial judge
felt that there may be some confusion by the jury as to whether the
employee had assumed the risk of the defendant's failure to use due
care which would not constitute a defense to the employer, or whether
the defendant had not been negligent, a full defense. Therefore, he in-
structed the jury, over the defendant's objection, 9 on the issue of as-
sumption of risk to distinguish it from non-negligence of the em-
ployer. The jury found for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed
on the ground that the trial court erred in instructing on assumption
of risk. The Court of Appeals held that the instruction was proper,
stating, "We think that the trial judge was justified in thinking that
in the absence of a charge on assumption of risk, the jury might have
considered that defense under the guise of nonnegligence." 20
A second danger of error, in the absence of an instruction, is that
the jury will consider as contributory negligence, actions of the em-
ployee that actually constitute assumption of risk. If the jury were
to make this error, the amount of damages due the plaintiff would be
erroneously reduced under the doctrine of comparative negligence,
17o Harper & James, supra note 16.
"192 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1951).
'1The defendant objected on the ground that "there was no issue made by
the pleadings or evidence with respect to any assumption of risk and the injection
of this issue would tend to lead the jury to believe that the plaintiff might not be
required under the law to exercise ordinary care that would be placed upon him
by all the circumstances of the case, and such charge was calculated to confuse the
jury to the prejudice of the defendant." Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burkett, supra
note 18 at 943.
' Id. at 913.
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when actually the plaintiff is entitled to full recovery.21 Nickell v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R.2 2 involved a situation in which the possibility of
such an error arose where the employee was struck by one of the Rail-
road's express trains while crossing the tracks to go to work. A tun-
nel had been provided for passing under the tracks, but the path
across the tracks was often used by employees. The Railroad had a
rule that employees were not to cross the tracks except in the perform-
ance of their duties. The question presented was whether the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent in carelessly crossing the tracks, or
whether he assumed the risk by crossing the tracks against the regu-
lations of the employer. The trial judge, to distinguish the terms for
the jury, over the Railroad's objection, gave instructions on contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk. The jury returned a judgment
for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the instructions were proper.
Often the opposition to an instruction distinguishing assumption
of risk and contributory negligence2 3 is based upon the argument that
the instruction would confuse the jury since the distinction is difficult2 i
for even the judge to draw and comprehend.2 However, this argu-
ment is answered by the better reasoning that even if it is difficult for
a judge to make the distinction, it is better that he should do it than
to leave the difficult task to laymen less trained in the law.26
The better reasoning supports the view that the trial judge should
instruct the jury on assumption of risk and its distinction from con-
tributory negligence. The distinction must be stated in a manner ap-
plicable to the particular fact situation.
aThis error can, of course, operate both ways. If the jury were to erroneously
consider conduct by the plaintiff constituting contributory negligence as assump-
tion of risk, the plaintiff would obtain a full recovery when it should be reduced
under the doctrine of comparative negligence.
2'347 Ill. App. 2o2, xoG N.E.od 738 (1952).
nAlthough the general view is that the defense of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence are separate and distinct, some courts and writers hold
that they are identical in their legal effect. Porter v. Cornett, 3o6 Ky. 25, 206 S.W.2d
83 (1947). See also 35 Am. Jur. Master and Servant § 296 (1941).
2 The difficulty in making this distinction is well recognized by writers and
the courts. See Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 205 U.s. 1, 12-13 (1906); Prosser,
Torts § 55 (955).
-Supra note 2 at 374, 375 (Dissenting opinion of Justice Ganey). See also Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Tiller case, supra note 14 at 72,
where he stated, "Because of its ambiguity the phase 'assumption of risk' is a
hazardous legal tool. As a means of instructing a jury, it is bound to create
confusion. It should therefore be discarded."
"See Koshorek v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 2 at 369.
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The distinction may be drawn as to whether the essence of the
plaintiff's conduct was carelessness, implying contributory negligence,
or venturesomeness, implying assumption of risk.
27
A more useful distinction may concern causation; namely that
contributory negligence is a proximate cause of the injury but assump-
tion of risk plays no part in causing the accident except exposure to
the danger.28 This distinction, stated in another way, is that con-
tributory negligence is a matter of an act more immediately leading
to the accident, while assumption of risk is preliminary conduct in
getting into a dangerous situation.
20
A further distinction is that contributory negligence is a breach of a
duty imposed by law, while assumption of risk is not a breach of a duty
but a voluntary undertaking.3 0 Prosser makes this distinction by stat-
ing, "Assumption of risk is a matter of knowledge of the danger and
intelligent acquiescence in it, while contributory negligence is a
matter of some fault or departure from the standard of reasonable con-
duct, however, unwilling or protesting the plaintiff may be."31
An additional distinction which may be helpful concerns the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct. Contributory negligence
never involves entirely reasonable conduct by the plaintiff, while as-
sumption of risk may involve such reasonable conduct.
32
Applying these distinctions to the fact situation in the Koshorek
case, it appears that the plaintiff's actions constituted assumption of
risk. Koshorek's conduct was preliminary conduct in getting into the
dangerous situation rather than an act immediately causing the dis-
ease. It further appears that his actions were reasonable and not care-
less. Since the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, it is quite
possible the jury considered the plaintiff's conduct under the guise
of contributory negligence or non-negligence of the employer. In fact,
the only way the jury could have found for the defendant was to have
"Sufelberger v. Worden, 189 Kan. 379, 369 P.2d 382 (1962); Taylor v. Hos-
tetler, 186 Kan. 788, 352 P.2d 1042 (196o); Spurlin v. Nardo, 145 W. Va. 408, 114
S.E.2d 913 (196o); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S.E. 57 (1937).
zsSaeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 248, 8 Cal. Rptr. 747
(Dist. Ct. App. 196o).
'Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P.R.R., 205 U.S. 1 (1907); Johnson v .Mammoth
Vein Coal Co., 88 Ark. 243, 114 S.V. 722 (19o8) (quoting Schlemmer case); Bouch-
ard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A.2d 439 (1944).
"'Hay v. Nance, 119 F. Supp. 763 (D. Alaska 1954); Dempsey v. Sawyer, 95 Me.
295, 19 At. 1035 (19o); Cathey v. DeWeese, 289 S.E.2d 51 (Mo. 1956); El Paso &
S.W.R.R. v. Foth, 1o1 Tex. 135, 100 S.XV. 171 (Civ. App. 19o7).
3'Prosser, Torts § 55 (1955)-
2Potter v. Brittan, 286 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1961), quoting Harper & James, Torts
§ 22.2 (1956).
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